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The Optimal Time to File for Social Security Bene ts
When should a newly retired worker le a claim for Social Security bene ts?
Although conventional wisdom and common practice suggest that he or she should do this immediately, we show that in many cases a newly retired worker should wait several years before ling for bene ts.
This nding arises from the e ects of the actuarial reduction and the delayed retirement credit, which may be applied in determining the monthly bene t amount.
As a result of these provisions, a newly retired worker is e ectively entitled to make a selection from a menu of annuities. In addition to the standard one that begins paying bene ts immediately, the items on this menu are deferred annuities that begin paying xed monthly bene ts sometime after retirement. The bene ts of the di erent annuities are structured so that the longer payments are deferred the greater the monthly bene t will be. Since there is a trade-o between how soon bene ts begin and how high the bene t level is, there clearly is opportunity for economic choice.
The purposes of this paper are to illuminate these features of the Social Security system and to explore the choices that individuals would make in various cases.
Our analysis extends some aspects of Feldstein's (1990) study of the optimal age structure of social security bene ts, by providing a more realistic life cycle environment and by applying the model to actual Social Security rules. He considers an overlapping generations model in which retirement lasts for one or two periods, depending on the outcome of uncertain mortality. In our terms, the \menu of alternative annuities" that he considers is the set of all annuities that have the same actuarial value. For his \rational egoists," who ignore the e ects of unintended bequests on future generations, he nds that (under certain conditions) newly retired workers would prefer to postpone bene ts until the second period of retirement. Our ndings seem consistent with Feldstein's to the extent that they are comparable.
In the next section of this paper we describe the actuarial adjustment and delayed retirement credit provisions of the Social Security system, and we explain how they determine the menu of alternative annuities that are available to an individual. Following that we present an actuarial analysis of these annuities for men and women who retire at age 62 in 1998. These case studies give insight into the workings of the system, and they provide some assessment of the actuarial fairness of the bene t adjustments.
In the main section below we develop a model of retirement planning for an individual who is making a choice from a menu of Social Security annuities. We assume that behavior is described by a life cycle model that incorporates realistic mortality data, but has no bequest motive. The individual's resources are whatever wealth was accumulated by saving before retirement plus an entitlement to receive Social Security bene ts. Private nancial markets in the economy are imperfect and do not o er actuarially fair annuities.
We apply this model to two sets of Social Security annuities: the one which prevails under the rules in place for 1998, and a hypothetical one that would prevail if the actuarial adjustment and delayed retirement credit were actuarially fair. In simulations we trace out consumption and bene t plans over all the possible years of retirement. We are able to identify the optimal annuity and to calculate the gain that the individual can achieve by optimally deferring the startup of bene ts. We nd that the gain from deferral can be substantial in many cases, especially when the amount of marketable wealth held at the time of retirement is relatively large compared with the value of Social Security bene ts.
As will be seen, the model and its analysis provide a limited framework for understanding the opportunities and incentives that result from rather complex provisions of the Social Security system. One of the main limitations is that we focus on an individual worker and ignore the additional complications that arise for married couples. Other simpli cations that limit the direct applicability of the model are noted below. Despite all this, however, the results should be of interest to makers of Social Security policy and students of the system.
THE MENU OF SOCIAL SECURITY ANNUITIES
The alternative structures of Social Security bene ts that an individual retiree is entitled to receive depend on a number of factors. In the following description and analysis we con ne our discussion to the bene ts payable to a fully retired individual with insured worker status under the Old Age and Survivors Insurance component of Social Security in the U.S., ignoring other complexities of the system.
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The bene ts received from Social Security are like the bene ts from an annuity, and we use the terms interchangeably. We deal only with xed annuities, for which bene ts remain at a constant level. If the bene ts of an annuity begin in the rst period of retirement we say it is an \immediate annuity," and if they begin at any later time we say it is a \deferred annuity."
The actual level of bene ts is based on the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which is determined by a progressive formula applied to a worker's earnings history.
As is well known, the system is not designed to be actuarially fair with regard to contributions and bene ts over a worker's lifetime. However, the concept of actuarial fairness is an appropriate frame of reference for analyzing how actual bene ts are related to the PIA.
During the rst twenty years of its operation the Social Security bene t structure was limited to a xed annuity beginning at age 65. A worker retiring at age 65 would view this as an immediate annuity, but a worker retiring at age 59 would view this as a deferred annuity beginning in the seventh year of retirement.
In 1956 a provision was added that allowed women to receive bene ts as early as age 62, with an \actuarial reduction" of 5/9 of one percent of the PIA for each month before age 65 that bene ts actually began (i.e. 6.67 percent reduction per year). In 1961 this was extended to men. This provision allows persons who retire between ages 62 and 65 to begin receiving bene ts immediately instead of waiting for a deferred annuity beginning at age 65. The actuarial reduction aims to do this without greatly altering the actuarial value of lifetime bene ts.
In 1972 a \delayed retirement credit" was instituted, which increased bene ts by 1/12 percent of the PIA for each month between ages 65 and 72 in which no bene t was paid. The purpose of this provision was to provide some equity for individuals who retire later than age 65 and for retired bene ciaries who receive no bene ts in some months because of the \earnings test." Legislation passed in 1983 reduced the upper age limit for the delayed retirement credit from 72 to 70, and it provided for a gradual increase in the credit. For workers reaching age 62 in 1997{8, the monthly credit is 1/2 percent of PIA (6 percent per year). The monthly credit will increase in stages to 2/3 percent of PIA (8 percent per year) for workers reaching age 62 in 2005.
A cost of living adjustment for Social Security bene ts was enacted in 1972.
As a result of this, bene ts received during retirement are xed in real terms, and all the analysis in the rest of the paper is couched this way.
Under current law, monthly payments do not begin until a claim for bene ts is led. Thus, for example, an individual retiring in 1998 at age 62 could choose to le for bene ts in 2000 and thereby receive a deferred annuity beginning at age 64. Applying the actuarial reduction, the deferred annuity bene t would be 93.33 percent of PIA in this case, whereas the immediate annuity bene t would have been 80 percent of PIA. Thus, deferring the bene ts claim for two years beyond retirement at age 62 would increase the monthly bene t by about 17 percent. If that same individual retiring in 1998 at age 62 chose to le for bene ts at age 67, the monthly bene t would be 112 percent of PIA. In this case, deferring the bene ts claim for ve years beyond retirement at age 62 would increase the monthly bene t by 40 percent.
Taken together in various ways, the actuarial reduction and the delayed retirement credit e ectively allow workers retiring before age 70 to choose their bene t structure from a menu of deferred annuities. Each annuity on the menu is characterized by the age at which bene ts begin and by the level of the bene t. The longer bene ts are deferred, the higher the bene t level will be. The system uses a monthly accounting period, so a worker who retires at age 62 can choose from a menu of nearly 100 di erent annuities. One might say that the menu is \imperfect" because the actuarial adjustment and the delayed retirement credit are not exactly fair (in an actuarial sense) and because there is no real choice after age 70. (1)
Notice that for an individual retiring at any given age, the actuarial values of alternative annuities depend on his or her survival probabilities, the market rate of interest, and the structure of bene ts as de ned by the rules determining the B amounts. In general the various V values available to an individual will depend on , the year bene t payments begin. In the special situation where the actuarial values of the alternative annuities are all equal, the structure of bene ts is said to be actuarially fair for the individual.
RULES
To provide information about the fairness of the actual system, we compute the actuarial values V under the rules prevailing in 1998 for men and women retiring at age 62 that year. The calculations are made with interest rates of 1, 3, and 5 percent; of these, 1 and 3 percent are probably the most appropriate.
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The actuarial values are then reexpressed in relative terms as the percentage of the value of the immediate annuity that begins at age 62.
The results are shown in Table 1 . The second column, under the heading r = :01, shows the relative values of the alternative annuities for men when the interest rate is one percent. These values initially increase with the age at which bene ts begin. However, the actuarial value reaches a peak at age 65 and then steadily decreases. After age 67, the actuarial value falls below its age-62 level.
By contrast, when the rate of interest is ve percent, the actuarial value steadily decreases with the age at which bene ts begin. As can be seen, when r = :03 the pattern lies between these two situations.
Since survival rates for women are greater than those for men at any particular age, it is clear from (1) that the absolute actuarial value V will be greater for women than for men (for the same ). Comparison of columns in Table 1 reveals that the relative values for women also lie above the corresponding values for men.
That is, Social Security consistently provides women a more generous reward for deferring bene ts than it provides men. The patterns of departure-from-fairness for women are similar to those for men, although the age for the peak actuarial value is always greater for women.
FAIR ADJUSTMENTS
Another way to look at the actuarial fairness of Social Security adjustments is to compare them directly with fair adjustments. Fair adjustments are those that lead to an actuarially fair set of annuities being available to deferred lers.
In a system with actuarially fair annuities, the deferred bene t levels B must be set so that the actuarial values of the alternative annuities are all equal. Suppose that the bene t amount B 1 of the immediate annuity to which the individual is entitled is given (on the basis of PIA, say). Let the actuarial value of this annuity, calculated by (1), be V 1 . The bene t levels B for the alternative deferred annuities can be computed from
Given V 1 , which is a measure of Social Security wealth, the set of B that make up a menu of fair annuities depends on the survival rates S t and the rate of interest r.
We calculate these fair-annuity bene t levels for men and women retiring in 1998 at age 62. Then, the bene t levels of the annuities starting at each age are compared with the bene t level of the annuity starting at age 65, and the implicit year-by-year fair actuarial reductions or fair delayed retirement credits are computed. The results are presented in Table 2 . For comparison, the table also shows the actual actuarial reduction and delayed retirement credits that hold at each age under the 1998 rules. The results in Table 2 , of course, are simply another way of looking at the information that underlies Table 1 .
To review how these hypothetical and actual Social Security adjustments work, consider the results in Table 2 for men, using a one-percent interest rate. A worker who retires at age 62 has a PIA based on his earnings record. If bene ts are deferred to age 65, the bene t equals PIA and the adjustment is zero. The table entry \{6.50" for age 64 shows that if bene ts are deferred to that age, the bene t must be set 6.50 percent below the PIA to achieve a fair actuarial reduction. In a more complex way, the table entry \{5.86" for age 63 shows that if bene ts are deferred to that age, the bene t must be set 5:86 + 6:50 = 12:36 percent below the PIA; that is, the bene t must be 87.64 percent of PIA. Similarly, if bene ts are deferred to age 67, the bene t must be 7:23+8:07 = 15:30 percent greater than the PIA in order to achieve a fair delayed retirement credit.
In Table 2 we see that the downward or upward fair adjustments for women are smaller than those for men at the same age and rate of interest. This occurs because the longer life expectancy for women means that a smaller adjustment in the level of future bene ts is needed to compensate for taking or abstaining from a year of bene ts up front. Similarly, a lower interest rate means that a smaller adjustment in future bene ts is needed for such a compensation.
The actual adjustments under the 1998 rules are shown in the last column of Table 2 , and these can be compared with the required fair adjustments shown in the other columns. At a one-percent interest rate, the actual 1998 actuarial reductions of 6.67 percent (ages 62{64) are consistently greater than the fair adjustments for both men and women, leading to a nancial penalty for ling immediately at retirement under current law. At r = :03, the actual reductions are rather close to the fair adjustments. At r = :05, however, the actual reductions are mostly smaller than fair, leading to a bonus for ling earlier than age 65. Looking at the delayed retirement credit (ages 66{70) we see that the actual 1998 credit of 6.0 percent is smaller than all but one of the fair adjustments, so that ling later than age 66 leads to a nancial penalty under current law. If the actual delayed retirement credit were increased to 8 percent for 1998, men would still be penalized for ling after age 66, but women would face a mixed situation.
Finally, if the comparison of bene ts underlying Table 2 were reexpressed as fair \delayed ling credits" computed as adjustments to the age-62 bene t, the annual credit would steadily increase with age. One way to understand why is to note that the expected length of life gets shorter as the individual ages one year, so the fair proportionate compensation for giving up a year's bene t gets larger. Such \delayed ling credits" are very much in the spirit of our analysis, but they do not have direct statutory counterparts.
THE CHOICE OF WHEN TO FILE
Given that Social Security o ers a menu of annuities to a newly retired individual, which item will be chosen? In practical terms, when should a newly retired worker le a claim to receive bene ts?
The answer depends, in part, on the nature of private nancial markets. If perfect markets existed, an individual could arrange a lifetime consumption pro le that is independent of the times at which income is received. Under these conditions, retired individuals should defer ling for Social Security bene ts until the age at which the actuarial value of the bene ts is maximized. Feldstein (1990) . We assume that the individual's marketable wealth is invested in one-year notes that earn interest at the constant real rate r. Principal and interest are repaid in the next year, to the individual or the surviving estate.
Importantly, we assume that there is no private market for annuities or for notes whose rate of return is related to survival probabilities.
A more realistic model would include pensions as a third nancial resource for retirement. If the pension were like an immediate xed annuity, the qualitative nature of our results would probably not be greatly altered but the presentation would be made more complicated. On the other hand, some pension plans (such as TIAA-CREF) e ectively o er a menu of immediate and deferred annuities to a newly retired worker. If such a pension were included in the model, another decision regarding when to begin bene ts would be required and it is not clear how our results would be a ected.
The model examines behavior in a strict form of retirement, in which there is no labor income and no opportunity to reenter the labor force. In order to focus on the question of when to le for bene ts, we take the time of retirement as given rather than as something to be explained. In our view, the decision of when to retire requires the individual to determine the optimal time to le for bene ts (as we do here) conditional on each possible age of retirement. This information, along with a host of other factors that may depend on the age of retirement, would then be used to choose the optimal retirement age. Such a model, though interesting and more complete, is beyond the purpose and scope of this paper.
We assume that at the time of retirement an individual holds a certain amount of marketable wealth and an entitlement to receive Social Security bene ts. Looking forward, the individual makes a plan for using this wealth to nance consumption for the rest of life. The optimal time to le for bene ts is determined in conjunction with the optimal plan for consumption. We assume that there is no bequest motive.
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For the individual retiree, consumption in year t is denoted by C t . Utility within a single year is assumed to be given by the isoelastic utility function U (C) = 
where is the rate of time preference. In this formulation, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Life cycle behavior in retirement with an immediate annuity has been examined by Mirer (1992) and others, and we extend this to deferred annuities. To understand the resulting plans, we rst examine the optimal consumption plan that would be chosen for a given , the time when bene t payments begin. Extending our previous notation, let the annual annuity bene t be given by 
The f ; B g combinations de ne the items in the annuity menu; they are determined by Social Security rules.
In any year the resources available for consumption are the holdings of marketable wealth, the interest earned from that wealth, and the annuity bene t B t .
Hence the amount of marketable wealth (W) that is carried over to the next year is
We assume that the \no-borrowing" liquidity constraints W t 0 hold for all years.
These constraints embody the idea that nancial markets would not allow net borrowing of marketable wealth because of the default risk due to death.
A general theoretical analysis of life cycle behavior subject to liquidity constraints like these is presented by Mariger (1987) . Following his work, and based on the key empirical fact that the age-speci c rate of death d t increases with age in retirement, 6 it is possible to show that the optimal plan consists of two sequential phases. The rst phase ends when marketable wealth is exhausted, which we denote as year T . This occurs in or after the year before positive annuity bene ts begin:
? 1 T N .
In the rst phase, when the liquidity constraint is never binding, the necessary condition for interior solutions leads to C t = C t?1
(1 + r)(1 ? d t )
(1 + ) (1= ) t = 2; : : :; T:
Since the present value of all consumption expenditures in the rst phase must equal the present value of resources available through T , consumption in the rst year is
where F t C t =C t?1 denotes the complex expression in (6) and F 1 = 1 for notational convenience. Consumption in years 2 through T of the rst phase is determined by (6). In the second phase, the only resource is the xed annuity bene t, so C t = B for t > T .
To examine the implications of this model, we calculate individuals' complete retirement plans for various values of the relevant parameters. The age-speci c rates of death d t are based on the life tables used in the previous section.
For the unobservable behavioral parameters and for the rate of interest, we explore ranges of values that include the most commonly used values in similar life cycle simulations. In a study that nds retired persons' wealth holding behavior to be consistent with life cycle theory, Hurd (1989) The calculations determine the optimal annuity in a two-step procedure. First, for each value of (i.e. for each of the available annuities) we search for the largest value of T for which the consumption plan satisfying (6) and (7) satis es the noborrowing constraints. Mariger's Propositions 1 and 2 imply that this algorithm yields the rst phase of the optimal consumption plan, and thus the complete plan can be determined. As part of this step, we calculate the expected utility EU ( ) associated with the complete optimal consumption plan for each value of .
Second, we scan all the computed values of EU ( ) to determine its maximum.
This identi es the optimal annuity, which begins paying bene ts at t = and yields EU ( ) as its expected utility. Year is the optimal time to le for Social Security bene ts.
The model is rst applied to the Social Security rules of 1998, which are not actuarially fair for most individuals. We then apply the model to the hypothetical situation in which Social Security can provide exactly fair annuities, which is like the situation considered by Feldstein (1990) . For economy of presentation we show detailed results only for men; the results for women are discussed later.
RULES
We rst consider the choices that an individual would make when the alternative available annuities are determined by the Social Security rules that prevail in 1998. Figure 1 illustrates the case for which the market rate of interest is r = :03, the retiree's rate of time preference is = :01, the measure of risk aversion is = 1, and the ratio of the immediate annuity level to initial wealth is B 1 =W 1 = :05.
The vertical axis in Figure 1 shows the ratio of the annual consumption and bene t levels to the initial holdings of wealth W 1 , in percentage points. The immediate Social Security annuity begins at age 62 and has a constant level of 5. This is illustrated by the line of that height, starting at age 62. (Although the bene ts are discrete annual amounts, the line is drawn as continuous for clarity.) The optimal annuity begins at age 66, in the 5th year of retirement; it has a constant level of 6.625, which is 32.5 percent greater than the level of the immediate annuity because of the actuarial reduction and the delayed retirement credit.
The consumption plan that would be chosen if the retiree received the immediate annuity is shown by the series of empty circles, and the plan chosen in conjunction with the optimal annuity is shown by the series of lled circles. (The two series partially overlap through age 84.) With the immediate annuity, consumption in the early years of retirement is greater than the level of Social Security benets; the di erence is nanced by interest income and dissaving of wealth. Wealth is exhausted at age 86, and after that consumption is nanced solely from Social Security bene ts. With the optimal annuity, consumption in the rst four years of retirement is nanced solely from interest and dissaving. Starting in the fth year, consumption is nanced from Social Security bene ts plus interest and dissaving| until age 84, after which wealth has been exhausted and consumption is nanced solely from Social Security bene ts.
In this particular case the consumption plan supported by the optimal annuity dominates the immediate plan, in the sense that consumption is higher in every year of retirement if bene ts are deferred to the fth year of retirement rather than started immediately. Clearly the optimal plan is preferred. To assess how great the incentive is to choose the deferred annuity, we calculate (by iteration) the percentage increase in PIA that would be necessary for an immediate annuity to yield the original EU ( ) of the optimal deferred annuity. In this case, the bene t of being able to defer the annuity and doing so optimally is equivalent to being given an immediate annuity based on a PIA that is 7.3 percent greater than actual PIA.
The same computations are carried out for cases that correspond to all the combinations of the basic parameters. The top panel of Table 3 shows the year of retirement ( ) in which the individual would choose to le for Social Security bene ts. In each row the rst two positions are parameter values ( and ) that are common to the six cases reported in that row. The column headings for B 1 =W 1 and r complete the identi cation of each case. For our set of parameters, we see that the choice ranges from the 2nd to the 9th year of retirement, corresponding to ages 63 to 70. We note from Table 1 that the actuarial value of bene ts reaches its peak in the 4th, 2nd, and 1st year of retirement when the interest rate is 1, 3, and 5 percent, respectively. Comparing the values in Table 3 to these years, we see that the optimal time to le typically occurs after the year of peak actuarial value.
The gain from choosing the optimal deferred annuity rather than accepting the immediate annuity at age 62 is shown in the bottom panel of Table 3 . These gains are calculated as the equivalent percentage increase in PIA, as explained above.
Across the range of parameters, the gains range from less than 1 percent to more than 20 percent.
The e ects of changes in various parameters can be seen by looking at the cases reported in Table 3 . When Social Security is less important in retirement nancing, as indicated by a lower value for B 1 =W 1 , ling is deferred to a later age and the proportionate bene t from late ling is greater|as compared with the situation when Social Security is more important. Greater rates of time preference ( ) lead to ling at an earlier (or the same) age, and they lead to smaller e ciency gains.
Greater rates of risk aversion lead to ling at a later (or the same) age, and they lead to larger e ciency gains.
Under the Social Security rules for 1998, higher rates of interest lead to ling at a somewhat earlier age and getting substantially smaller e ciency gains. One factor that helps determine these results is that the age for the peak actuarial value of Social Security bene ts decreases as the interest rate increases.
From the perspective of policy, perhaps the most important personal factor determining the optimal time to le for Social Security bene ts is the relative importance of Social Security and marketable wealth at the time of retirement. In cases where Social Security is a relatively large component of a retiree's resources (with high B 1 =W 1 ), there is less opportunity for deferring bene ts while nancing consumption solely from private wealth. In Table 3 we see shorter deferrals and smaller proportionate gains from deferral. Oppositely, in cases where Social Security is less important, deferral is longer and the gain is greater. Typically, the people who have the most to gain from understanding and taking advantage of the opportunities for deferring bene ts are those who have enjoyed relatively high lifetime incomes and have accumulated a substantial amount of wealth.
Also, we can determine the e ect of retirees' choices on Social Security nances.
Whether the system is better or worse o nancially when the retiree defers ling for bene ts depends on whether the actuarial value of the chosen annuity is smaller or larger than the value of the immediate annuity. From Table 1 we see that this depends on the rate of interest. For men, the system will be better o if the annuity is deferred at least 6 years when r = :01, at least 3 years when r = :03, and at least 1 year when r = :05.
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From Table 3 we see that when r = :03 or .05, the optimal length of deferral is long enough to make the system better o . When r = :01 the results are mixed: the system will be better o in most cases with B 1 =W 1 = :05, but it will be worse o in all cases with B 1 =W 1 = :20. Among these cases with r = :01, the persons who will gain the most from deferring bene ts (those with a high degree of risk aversion and a substantial amount of marketable wealth) will make the system better o by doing so.
How can the individual retiree and the Social Security system both be made better o by the deferral of bene ts? Being able to defer bene ts in exchange for a higher level, instead of taking the immediate annuity, allows the individual to rearrange the nancing of his consumption path in a way that resembles the arrangements that would be made in perfect private annuity markets if they existed.
The e ciency gains to the retiree from these arrangements are great enough here to o set some decrease in the actuarial value of the bene ts that are provided by the system.
FAIR ADJUSTMENTS
We turn now to the idealized situation in which the deferred bene t levels B are set so that the actuarial values of the alternative annuities are all equal.
9
This situation, which is assumed in Feldstein's (1990) model, is interesting for two reasons. First, it is the norm toward which the actuarial reduction and delayed retirement credit seem to be aimed. Second, it provides a point of comparison that allows us to see how the results for the 1998 rules are a ected by di erences in actuarial values.
To recall how the adjustments for deferred ling can be made fair, suppose that the bene t amount B 1 of the immediate annuity to which the individual is entitled is set (on the basis of PIA, say). Let the actuarial value of this annuity, calculated by (1), be V 1 . The bene t levels B for the alternative deferred annuities can be computed from (2). The set of B implicitly de ne the fair adjustments to B 1 that are needed to generate the alternative annuities.
With fair adjustments it is easy to see why someone might prefer a deferred annuity (with > 1) to an immediate annuity (with = 1). A system of fair xed annuities is similar to one that gives an amount of wealth V 1 to a newly retired individual, but requires that this wealth be held in a special savings account maintained by Social Security. When the individual dies, the account disappears and the estate receives nothing. Each year interest accrues at the rate g t on the amount of funds in the account at the end of the previous year. This interest rate is determined from (1 + g t )(1 ? d t ) = (1 + r), where (1 ? d t ) is the probability of surviving from year t ? 1 to t. From the point of view of Social Security, the expected return that it pays is r, the regular market rate of interest|hence the account is \fair." However from the point of view of the retiree who has no regard for what happens after he dies, the relevant rate of interest is g t , which is greater than r. In this sense, the return to Social Security wealth is greater than the return to marketable wealth. Choosing a deferred annuity is comparable to arranging one's nances so as to use up a lower-yielding asset (marketable wealth) before a higher-yielding one (Social Security wealth), which is clearly advantageous.
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To compute the choices that an individual would make, we follow the same procedure as before. The results for the case shown in Figure 1 , but now with fair adjustments, are shown in Figure 2 . The immediate annuity and the consumption plan associated with it are the same as in the previous gure. The optimal annuity now begins at age 72, the 11th year of retirement. The deferred bene t level is 12.15, which is 143 percent greater than the bene t of the immediate annuity.
Consumption in the rst 10 years of retirement is nanced solely by marketable wealth, and after that consumption is nanced solely by Social Security bene ts.
In this case choosing the optimal annuity leads to slightly lower levels of consumption in the rst ten years of retirement (compared with taking the immediate annuity), in exchange for substantially greater consumption in later years. Although the optimal plan does not dominate, it is preferred. We calculate that choosing the optimal annuity is equivalent to accepting an immediate annuity that is based on a PIA that is 28.6 percent greater than the actual PIA.
The results for various cases are shown in Table 4 . As in the previous table, the top panel shows the year in which the optimal annuity begins paying bene ts, and the bottom panel shows the gain from deferral (computed as the percentage increase in PIA that would lead to an equivalent immediate annuity).
The most striking nding in Table 4 is that when Social Security is a relatively small portion of retirement resources (B 1 =W 1 = :05), the optimal choice typically calls for deferring bene ts until about the 10th year of retirement (age 71) and this leads to substantial gains in the e ectiveness of Social Security for the recipient.
Deferring bene ts this long increases the bene t level by 93, 119, and 150 percent when the interest rate is 1, 3, and 5 percent, respectively. The gain from delaying ling is substantially greater than under the 1998 rules for Social Security, especially when the interest rate is 3 percent or more.
By contrast, deferrals and the associated gains are more modest when B 1 =W 1 = :20; this was also the pattern in Table 3 . There are even cases when the deferral is shorter and the gain is smaller than under the 1998 rules|these occur when r = :01, which led to the actuarial value of bene ts being maximized if bene ts are deferred to age 65 for men under the 1998 rules.
The e ects of changes in the other personal parameters also mirror the pattern in Table 3 . Greater rates of time preference ( ) lead to ling at an earlier (or the same) age, and they lead to smaller e ciency gains. Greater rates of risk aversion lead to ling at a later (or the same) age, and they lead to larger e ciency gains.
Changes in the rate of interest have opposite e ects here than they did in Table 3 . Under the 1998 rules, the age at which the actuarial value of bene ts reaches its peak declines as the rate of interest increases; here, with fair adjustments, the actuarial values are constant and thus not related to the age at which bene ts begin. In Table 4 , with fair adjustments, we see that the length of deferral and the associated e ciency gain increase with the rate of interest.
RESULTS FOR WOMEN
In the context of this paper, \women" di er from \men" only in that they are persons who have more favorable mortality prospects (lower rates of death). The results regarding choice of the optimal Social Security annuity di er slightly.
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Under the 1998 rules, the alternative annuities available to women are exactly the same as those available to men. From Table 1 we see that the peak actuarial values of the annuities for women occur at ages that are one or two years greater than for men. This is re ected in the optimal time to le for bene ts: when Social Security is a relatively small component of retirement resources, the optimal time to le is typically about one year later for women, and when Social Security is more important (B 1 =W 1 = :20) the optimal time to le is either the same or just one year later for women.
The di erences in the gains from deferral are more striking. Although there is variation, the gains for women are typically about 50 percent greater than for men.
This arises simply because of longevity: for any given length of deferral, women can expect to live longer than men, and they will enjoy more years of upwardly adjusted bene ts.
These gains for individual women would potentially have mixed e ects on the nances of the Social Security system, depending importantly on the interest rate.
From Table 1 we see that when r = :01, any deferral by women will make the system worse o (i.e. the system will be providing an annuity of greater actuarial value).
By contrast, when r = :05, deferral of 2 years or more would make the system better o , and in all the cases we calculate this would hold true. When r = :03, deferral by women who are highly dependent on Social Security (B 1 =W 1 = :20)
would make the system worse o , but deferral by those with B 1 =W 1 = :05 would make the system better o in most cases.
With rules that yield fair adjustments, the alternative annuities are di erent for men and women because the adjustments take survival rates into account. For any given length of deferral, the appropriate upward adjustment in the bene t level is smaller for women. The optimal times to le are only slightly later for women than for men, as was true under the 1998 rules. When B 1 =W 1 = :05, the optimal time to le is typically one year later, but when B 1 =W 1 = :20 the time is typically unchanged.
Curiously, the gains from deferral are less than those for men in this case of fair adjustments. The gains for women are typically only about 75 percent as large.
Since the longer life expectancy has been actuarially balanced by a smaller upward adjustment, it might seem that the gain should be the same for men and women.
However, since women can expect to receive a greater proportion of their bene ts at greater ages, their utility from bene ts is subjected to heavier discounting for time preference. Hence, the gain is lower. 
CONCLUSION
Under current law, a newly retired worker can delay ling for Social Security bene ts until sometime after retirement. This has the e ect of allowing him or her to choose from a menu of annuities, which are structured so that the longer the startup of bene ts is deferred, the greater the bene t will be. For example, a worker retiring at age 62 can choose to begin receiving bene ts at age 67. Under the rules prevailing for 1998, deferring bene ts in this case would increase the monthly bene t amount by 40 percent.
What should the new retiree do? When private annuity markets are imperfect, the optimal choice is not based simply on the actuarial values of the alternatives.
We have presented a model of retirement planning based on life cycle behavior with no bequest motive. In simulations using the Social Security rules prevailing for 1998, we found that individuals will defer ling for bene ts until several years after retirement and that the gain from doing so is substantial in many cases. The deferral and the associated gain are largest when Social Security is a relatively small component of retirement resources, which is likely to hold for persons with a relatively large amount of wealth at the time of retirement. In simulations using a hypothetical set of fair adjustment rules, we found the deferrals and gains to be greater than under the 1998 rules in some cases but smaller in others.
In view of the substantial e ects found in our models, it is surprising that the opportunity for choice described here is not more widely discussed and taken advantage of. It is possible that most people have a very strong bequest motive (and thus avoid using up their marketable wealth), or that their behavior is substantially di erent from the rational life cycle model used here. 4. In studies of Social Security or the nancial behavior of retired persons, Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) prefer 1 percent, Steuerle and Bakija (1994) prefer 2 percent, and Hurd (1989) uses 3 percent.
5. The evidence on bequests is mixed. Hurd (1989) 8. In Table 1 the precise values underlying \100.0" at age 67 with r = :01 and at age 64 with r = :03 are less than 100.0.
9. It is important to note that the Social Security system would need to know the survival probabilities of the individual in order to provide fair adjustments.
With these adjustments, the nances of the system are not a ected by retirees' choices regarding the time to le for bene ts.
10. The special account described here is equivalent to an annuity in which the bene ts could vary exibly over time to conform with an optimal consumption pro le. The gains to deferral with such a exible annuity are somewhat greater than those reported here with a xed annuity.
11. Tables with the results for women are available from the author. 
